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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The undersigned Applicants (Yvonne MCDERMOTT REES and Federico CERUTTI) 
seek leave to make submissions as amicus curiae in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Karadžić, MICT-13-55-A, pursuant to Rule 83 of the MICT Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. 
2. The Applicants wish to offer their observations with regard to the Trial Chamber’s 
finding that the Accused possessed the mens rea for genocide in relation to the 
Srebrenica JCE.1 This finding has been identified as an issue in both Parties’ 
appellate briefs.2 
 
II. THE APPLICANTS 
 
3. Dr Yvonne McDermott Rees is Associate Professor of Law at Swansea 
University in the United Kingdom. She is the author of Fairness in International 
Criminal Trials (Oxford University Press, 2016) and over 50 journal articles and 
book chapters relating to international criminal law and procedure and human 
rights law. Her publications on the topic of evidence and proof in international 
criminal trials include ‘Inferential Reasoning and Proof in International Criminal 
Trials: The Potentials of Wigmorean Analysis’ (2015) 13(3) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 507-533; ‘The ICTR’s Fact-Finding Legacy: 
Lessons for the Future of Proof in International Criminal Trials’ (2015) 26(3) 
Criminal Law Forum 351-372; ‘Analysis of Evidence in International Criminal 
Trials using Bayesian Belief Networks’ (2017) 16(2-3) Law, Probability and Risk 
111-130 (with Colin Aitken), and ‘Strengthening the Evaluation of Evidence in 
International Criminal Trials’ (2017) 17(4) International Criminal Law Review 
682-702. 
4. Dr Federico Cerutti is a Lecturer at the School of Computer Sciences at Cardiff 
University in the United Kingdom. His research activity is focused mainly on 
nonmonotonic reasoning (in particular argumentation theory), and on decision 
support with uncertainty and trust. His research addresses models of arguments 																																																								
1 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016, paras. 5746-5831. 
2 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Radovan Karadzic’s Appeal Brief, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, 23 December 
2016, pp. 182-212; Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Prosecution Response Brief, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, 16 
May 2017, pp. 151-172. 
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and critiques for practical reasoning and decision support, and provides efficient 
algorithms for solving relevant problems in argumentation theory. He has co-
authored more than 50 peer-reviewed papers, including on the use of 
argumentation schemes for intelligence analysis,3 and on employing technical 
tools and algorithms to assist with reasoning.4   
5. Both Applicants are researchers on a project entitled Developing a Tool to Support 
Reasoning in International Criminal Trials, which aims to examine how insights 
from computer sciences, in particular the study of logic and argumentation 
schemes, could be used to support lawyers and judges working on complex 
international criminal cases. The Karadžić case was chosen as a case study for this 
project, in light of its topical nature and the interesting issues from the perspective 
of the science of logic that it gave rise to. The Applicants, believing that the MICT 
Appeals Chamber could benefit from this analysis, prepared the attached proposed 
amicus submissions.  
 
III. THE APPLICANTS’ REASONS FOR BELIEVING THEIR SUBMISSIONS WILL 
AID THE PROPER DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES 
 
6. The Applicants seek permission to submit amicus observations on the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that the Accused possessed the mens rea for genocide in 
Srebrenica. The enclosed submissions seek to chart the precise factual and 
inferential bases for these findings in the judgment, and to identify the forms of 
reasoning that led to these conclusions, from the perspective of logic theory.  
7. Our analysis shows that, whilst the Trial Chamber’s findings are generally 
founded on a sound evidentiary basis, the evidentiary foundations of some 
findings are unclear or unstated. Similarly, certain inferences that appear to have 
been drawn by the Trial Chamber in reaching its conclusions are not explicitly 
stated. 																																																								
3 Alice Toniolo, Timothy J. Norman, Anthony Etuk, Federico Cerutti, Robin Wentao Ouyang, Mani 
Srivastava, Nir Oren, Timothy Dropps, John A. Allen, and Paul Sullivan, ‘Supporting Reasoning with 
Different Types of Evidence in Intelligence Analysis’, (2015) Proceedings of the 2015 International 
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). 
4 Federico Cerutti, Mauro Vallati and Massimiliano Giacomin, ‘jArgSemSAT: An Efficient Off-the-
Shelf Solver for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks’ (2016) Proceedings of the Fifteenth International 
Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning 541-544; Id., ‘An Efficient Java-
Based Solver for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks: jArgSemSAT’ (2017) 26(2) International 
Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools, 1750002;  
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8. Given that the Appeals Chamber is asked to decide whether the Trial Chamber’s 
conclusions were such that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached, we 
believe that our elucidation of the key inferential steps taken by the Trial 
Chamber, and the critical questions to which they give rise, will be useful in the 
determination of that issue.  
 
IV. CONTACT OR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APPLICANTS AND ANY PARTY 
TO THE CASE 
 
9. MCDERMOTT REES has met Peter ROBINSON, counsel for Radovan Karadžić, on a 
number of occasions, and hosted him for a guest lecture at her previous institution 
(Bangor University) in 2015. MCDERMOTT REES has met Kate GIBSON of the 
Karadžić defence team once, when both were speakers at the ADC-ICT Annual 
Conference in The Hague in December 2017.  
10. MCDERMOTT REES has also been in contact with President Meron, in her capacity 
as co-convenor of a British Academy conference in March 2018 on the theme of 
Judicial Independence in Times of Crisis. President Meron was initially proposed 
as a keynote speaker at this conference, but owing to a competing commitment, is 
unable to attend.  
11. CERUTTI has no personal or professional connection with either Party to the 
Karadžić case.  
12. Neither Party has been consulted in the preparation of the enclosed amicus 
submissions. The proposed submissions represent the Applicants’ views alone. 
They are submitted for the sole purpose of assisting the Appeals Chamber in the 
proper determination of the issues identified in this application. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
13. Pursuant to Rule 83 of the MICT Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Applicants 
respectfully seek leave to file the proposed amicus curiae observations attached to 
this application. 
 
Word count: 1079 
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Respectfully submitted, 
 
_____________________________     _____________________________  
DR YVONNE MCDERMOTT REES  DR FEDERICO CERUTTI 
 
Dated this 21st day of February 2018 
At Swansea, United Kingdom
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MICT-13-55-A 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. These observations pertain to the Trial Chamber’s finding that the Accused 
possessed the mens rea for genocide in relation to the Srebrenica JCE.1 This 
finding was the subject of academic critique at the time of the Trial Judgment,2 and 
is likely to be a key issue to be decided on appeal.3 
 
2. As researchers with a particular interest in reasoning from the perspectives of law 
and logic, we believe that recourse to argumentation schemes4 can assist the 
Appeals Chamber in identifying the precise factual findings and inferential steps 
taken by the Trial Chamber in reaching its conclusions on this aspect of the 
Accused’s culpability.5  
 
3. Our intention in preparing this brief is not to suggest that the Trial Chamber’s 
findings were correct or incorrect, but to unpack the precise factual and inferential 
bases for these findings in the judgment, and to identify the forms of reasoning that 
led to these conclusions. We believe that this elucidation of the reasons for the 
relevant findings may assist the Appeals Chamber in determining whether the 
applicable appellate standard has or has not been met.  
 
4. We limited our analysis below to the reasoning process that can be fathomed from 
the Trial Chamber’s judgment. As such, we did not analyse issues such as the 																																																								
* The research that informed this brief formed part of a project entitled Developing a Tool to Support 
Judicial Reasoning in International Criminal Trials, funded in part by Cherish-DE, the United 
Kingdom’s Digital Economy Crucible (http://cherish-de.uk).  
1 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016 (hereinafter, ‘Karadžić 
Judgment’), paras. 5746-5831. 
2 E.g. Marko Milanović, ‘ICTY Convicts Radovan Karadzic’, EJIL: Talk!, 25 March 2016, available 
online at https://www.ejiltalk.org/icty-convicts-radovan-karadzic (last accessed 1 February 2018);  Kai 
Ambos, ‘Karadzic’s Genocidal Intent as the “Only Reasonable Inference”?’, EJIL: Talk!, 1 April 2016, 
available online at https://www.ejiltalk.org/karadzics-genocidal-intent-as-the-only-reasonable-inference 
(last accessed 1 February 2018);  Milena Sterio, ‘The Karadžić Genocide Conviction: Inferences, Intent, 
and the Necessity to Redefine Genocide’ (2017) 31 Emory International Law Review 271-298. 
3 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Radovan Karadzic’s Appeal Brief, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, 23 December 
2016, pp. 182-212; Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Prosecution Response Brief, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, 16 
May 2017, pp. 151-172. 
4 Defined and explained in para. 10 below.  
5 This is the standard established in, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Sainović et al., Decision on David J. 
Scheffer’s Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, Case No. IT-05-87-A, 7 September 2010, p. 2.  
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reliability of witnesses or evidence, which are the purview of the Trial Chamber 
alone.  
 
5. We focused our analysis only on the findings that the Accused embraced the 
expansion of the common plan to remove Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica to 
include the killing of men and boys, and that the Accused shared the intent to 
destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. However, the methods set out below 
could be utilised by the Appeals Chamber in its analysis of any of the Trial 
Chamber’s findings.  
 
6. Before introducing the argumentation scheme charts created (part IV) and analysis 
(part V), this brief sets out the principles of logical analysis (part II) and the relevant 
factual findings of the Trial Chamber (part III).  
 
II. PRINCIPLES OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
7. The term logic can be applied across a range of disciplines. For the sake of this 
brief, we will adopt Hofweber’s definition of ‘certain valid inferences and good 
reasoning based on them’. 6 It is worth noting that this does not cover the entire 
spectrum of critical and rational thinking; rather, it focuses on inferences that can be 
formally validated within—usually—a mathematical framework. Let us consider for 
instance one of the simplest and best known types of inferences, namely Aristotle's 
syllogism in its traditional format: 
 
Major Premise: All men are mortals 
Minor Premise: Socrates is a man 
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal 
 
This simple example allows us to identify the three important elements in an inference: 
major premise or rule; (minor) premise; and conclusion. There are three types of 
inferences that can be drawn from these elements: 																																																								
6 Thomas Hofweber, ‘Logic and Ontology’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), available online at: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/logic-ontology/ (last accessed 14 February 2018). 
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• Deduction: given a major premise (or a general rule), and a specific case, we 
infer the conclusion for the specific case. This is the case in Aristotle's 
syllogism. 
• Induction: given a set of associations between minor premise and conclusion, 
we infer a general rule. In the case above, observing that Socrates is both a man 
and a mortal gives ground to infer that all men are mortals. This type of 
reasoning is often related to probabilistic and defeasible inferences: for 
example, by observing that most sheep are white, we conclude that sheep are 
usually white. 
• Abduction: given a conclusion, and given a reasonable major premise, we can 
infer a minor premise. In the case above, observing that Socrates is mortal, and 
assuming the major premise ‘All men are mortals’ leads us to conclude that 
Socrates is a man. However, assuming the major premise ‘All dogs are mortals’ 
would lead us to conclude that Socrates is a dog. 
 
8. Classical logic is inherently deductive: provided that the major premises are 
correct, we now have mathematical and computational tools to prove (or disprove) 
whether a specific conclusion holds from a set of major and minor premises.7 The 
scientific process is often based on inductive reasoning: scientists observe 
phenomena, derive a general rule (major premise), and test it extensively.8 
Abduction is widely used in common sense reasoning and scientific reasoning.9 In 
criminal trials, the generation of hypotheses by both prosecution and defence is 
also typically an abductive process.10 
 
9. The process of reaching conclusions on the guilt or innocence of the accused may 
be a straightforward exercise in deduction. For example, if we assume the major 
premise that people’s fixed designs are usually carried out, and that A had a fixed 
design to kill B, we can reach the conclusion that A probably carried out his fixed 
																																																								
7 Stephen Cole Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1952). 
8 For instance, the law of universal gravitation was derived by observations. 
9 Jonathan Adler, ‘Testimony, Trust, Knowing’ (1994) 91 Journal of Philosophy 264–275. 
10 David A. Schum, Species of Abductive Reasoning in Fact Investigation in Law’ (2001) 22 Cardozo L. 
Rev 1645-1681; On abduction and induction generally, see Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Abduction and 
Induction’, in Justus Buchler (ed.), Philosophical Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 1955) 150-156. 
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design and killed B.11 Judicial reasoning may also be inductive, where conclusions 
are based on a common sense reading of the evidence presented. This was 
illustrated by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Rutaganda: 
 
The reasonable doubt standard in criminal law cannot consist in imaginary or 
frivolous doubt based on empathy or prejudice. It must be based on logic and 
common sense, and have a rational link to the evidence, lack of evidence or 
inconsistencies in the evidence.12 
 
We can also observe forms of abductive inference in judicial decision-making, 
most notably in the ‘inference to the best explanation’ approach. 13  In 
Ngirabatware, the Appeals Chamber noted that the standard of proof required ‘the 
exclusion of every reasonable alternative explanation [other than that of guilt]’.14 
 
10. Logic alone does not account for the entire notion of critical thinking. After 
Hamblin’s seminal work,15 the disciplines of informal logic and argumentation 
started to identify approaches to critical thinking, providing structures for 
inferences, and defining standard of proofs to evaluate them. For the sake of this 
brief, we will focus on the creation of argumentation schemes.16  
 
Argumentation schemes are abstract argument forms commonly used in 
everyday conversational argumentation, and other contexts, notably legal and 
scientific argumentation. […] Each scheme has a set of critical questions 
matching the scheme and such a set represents standard ways of critically 
probing into an argument to find aspects of it that are open to criticism.17 
																																																								
11 This example is taken from John Henry Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof, as Given by 
Logic, Psychology and General Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials (Chicago: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 1913), 417. 
12 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, 26 May 2003, para. 488. 
13 Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (London: Routledge, 1991), 32–38; Simon De Smet, 
‘Justified Belief in the Unbelievable’, in Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Quality Control in Fact-Finding (Torkal 
Opsahl Academic EPUblisher, 2013) 77, 89–91; Mark Klamberg, ‘The Alternative Hypothesis 
Approach, Robustness and International Criminal Justice: A Plea for a “Combined Approach” to 
Evaluation of Evidence’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 535; Ronald J. Allen & 
Michael Pardo, ‘Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation’, (2008) 27 Law & Philosophy 223; Douglas 
Walton, Abductive Reasoning (Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 23-26.  
14 Ngirabatware v. Prosecutor, Judgment, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, 18 December 2014, para. 20, citing 
Prosecutor v. Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, 5 May 2009, para. 220.  
15 Charles Leonard Hamblin. Fallacies (London: Methuen, 1970). 
16 Douglas Walton, Chris Reed and Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
17 Douglas Walton, ‘Argumentation Theory: A Very Short Introduction’, in Iyad Rahwan and Guillermo 
R. Sinari (eds), Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence (Dordrecht [etc.]: Springer, 2009), 1-22.  
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11. In legal scholarship, John Henry Wigmore pioneered an early form of 
argumentation scheme over a century ago.18 Wigmore’s charting method required 
the creation of two elements: a key list of factual propositions and a chart 
representing the inferential relationships between those propositions. 19  The 
purpose, in Wigmore’s own words, was to create: 
 
[S]ome method which will enable us to lift into consciousness and to state 
in words the reasons why a total mass of evidence does or should persuade 
us to a given conclusion, and why our conclusion would or should have 
been different or identical if some part of that total mass of evidence had 
been different. The mind is moved; then can we not explain why it is 
moved? If we can set down and work out a mathematical equation, why can 
we not set down and work out a mental probative equation?20 
 
Connections between Wigmore’s charting methods and argumentation schemes 
have already been investigated.21 
 
12. To illustrate a basic argumentation scheme, let us consider the so-called argument 
from cause to effect22 and its critical questions (CQ1-3): 
 
Major Premise: Generally, if A occurs, then B might occur. 
Minor Premise: In this case A might occur. 
Conclusion: Therefore, in this case B might occur. 
 
CQ1: How strong is the causal generalisation? 
CQ2: Is the evidence cited (if there is any) strong enough to warrant the causal 
generalisation? 
CQ3: Are there other causal factors that could interfere with the production of 
the effect in the given case? 
 																																																								
18 Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof (n 11). 
19 For further discussion and analysis, see Paul Roberts, ‘The Priority of Procedure and the Neglect of 
Evidence and Proof: Facing Facts in International Criminal Law’ (2015) 13(3) JICJ 479-506; Yvonne 
McDermott, ‘Inferential Reasoning and Proof in International Criminal Trials’ (2015) 13(3) JICJ 507-
533; Terence Anderson, David Schum and William Twining, Analysis of Evidence (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005).  
20 Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof (n 11), 4. 
21 E.g. Douglas Walton, ‘Argumentation and Theory of Evidence’ in Caroline M. Breur et al. (eds), New 
Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence, vol. 2, (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2000), 711-732. 
22 Douglas Walton, A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy (Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama 
Press, 1995). 
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13. An argument should not be considered warranted unless reasonable answers to 
each critical question are provided. Moreover, the existence of counterarguments 
as well as some answers to some critical questions can weaken an argument. 
While mathematically we can no longer prove the correctness of a conclusion 
given its premises, the community studying argumentation in artificial intelligence 
developed formal, mathematical methods for assessing the acceptability status of 
arguments in connection with a network of counterarguments.23  
 
14. To exemplify the graphical representation of inferences, let us consider the 
following instance of an argument from cause to effect: 
Major Premise: Generally, if Bosnian Muslims have been recently killed by 
Bosnian Serb forces, then it might occur that such forces will kill Bosnian 
Muslims in the future. 
 
Minor Premise: In this case Bosnian Muslim have been killed by Bosnian Serb 
forces. 
 
Conclusion: Therefore, in this case it might occur that Bosnian Muslims will be 
killed by Bosnian Serb Forces in the future. 
 
Figure 1 depicts such an argument. 
 
 																																																								
23 Phan Minh Dung, ‘On the Acceptability of Arguments and its Fundamental Role in Nonmonotonic 
Reasoning, Logic Programming and n-Person Games’ (1995) 77(2) Artificial Intelligence 321-357. 
	
		
Figure 1: Simple instance of an argument from cause to effect 
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15. In Figure 1, squared boxes depict pieces of information that can be used to draw 
inferences. Figure 2 depicts the case where two pieces of information are 
conflicting. 
 
16. For instance, if we consider only the case of Figure 2, let us denote with A the 
piece of information depicted on top (‘The plan to kill the Bosnian men and boys 
existed before the afternoon of 13 July’) and with B the opposite piece of 
information, both {A} and {B} alone are not conflicting and they can defend 
themselves against any conflict. However, since the intersection between {A} and 
{B} is empty, we cannot sceptically conclude anything about the degree of 
acceptability of A and B.24 Although approaches to reasoning with probabilities 
and weights have been proposed in the literature,25 and they would help in 
identifying whether A or B should have a higher degree of acceptability, the 
problem in using those approach is that deriving such quantitative assessments—
such as the probability of a pieces of information to be true—is extremely 
complicated and requires several assumptions and additional knowledge. As will 
become apparent in the analysis that follows, we chose not to enter in these 
discussions: deriving such quantitative assessments on the basis of the Trial 
Chamber’s decision alone would be unjustifiable from a scientific standpoint. 
 
17. Since 2015, one of the authors of this brief, together with colleagues, investigated 
the usage of argumentation schemes in the context of intelligence analysis, whose 
aim is to make sense of potentially incomplete or conflicting information in order 																																																								
24 In the following we will consider this notion of sceptical reasoning, which is widely accepted in the 
argumentation in artificial intelligence literature. 
25 E.g. Anthony Hunter and Matthias Thimm, ‘Probabilistic Reasoning with Abstract Argumentation 
Frameworks’ (2016) 59 Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 565-611. 
	
Figure 2: Simple example of conflicting pieces of information.	
6391MICT-13-55-A
	 8	
to identify hypotheses that enable the analyst to understand a situation.26 This 
research, inter alia, formally linked a graphical representation tool for inferences 
to one of the most prominent approaches for formal argumentation presented to 
date, ASPIC+;27 and employed state-of-the-art algorithms for efficient reasoning.28 
Senior analysts at the US Army Research Laboratory have positively evaluated 
this approach.29 As part of a subsequent project, the software (CISpaces) was 
improved and released.30 This software was used in the preparation of this brief’s 
analysis. Once pieces of information are linked by inferences and conflicts, 
CISpaces can identify those pieces of information such that: they are not 
conflicting each other; they can stand the conflicts they receive (e.g. collectively 
they defend themselves against any conflict), and they belong to all the maximal 
sets satisfying the previous two conditions (sceptical reasoning). 
 
III. RELEVANT FACTUAL FINDINGS 
 
18. A timeline in Appendix A of this brief sets out the Trial Chamber’s findings in 
chronological order. Having found that a common plan existed in Srebrenica to 
eliminate the Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica,31 the Trial Chamber held that the 
Accused ‘adopted and embraced the expansion of the plan’ to encompass the 
killing of the Bosnian Muslim men and boys of Srebrenica.32 The Chamber held 
that, in light of the Accused’s position as RS President and Supreme Commander, 
as well the consistent flow of information he sought and received throughout, he 
must have known of the expansion of the plan to include the killings ‘at some 																																																								
26 Alice Toniolo, Timothy J. Norman, Anthony Etuk, Federico Cerutti, Robin Wentao Ouyang, Mani 
Srivastava, Nir Oren, Timothy Dropps, John A. Allen, and Paul Sullivan, ‘Supporting Reasoning with 
Different Types of Evidence in Intelligence Analysis’, (2015) Proceedings of the 2015 International 
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). 
27 Henry Prakken, ‘An Abstract Framework for Argumentation with Structured Arguments’ (2010) 1(2) 
Argument and Computation 93-124. 
28 Federico Cerutti, Mauro Vallati and Massimiliano Giacomin, ‘jArgSemSAT: An Efficient Off-the-
Shelf Solver for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks’ (2016) Proceedings of the Fifteenth International 
Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning 541-544; Id., ‘An Efficient Java-
Based Solver for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks: jArgSemSAT’ (2017) 26(2) International 
Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools, 1750002.   
29 Alice Toniolo, Timothy J. Norman, Nir Oren, Federico Cerutti, John A. Allen, Mani Srivastava, and 
Paul Sullivan, ‘A User Evaluation of Argumentation, Crowdsourcing and Provenance Reasoning in 
Support of Collaborative Intelligence Analysis’ (working paper; on file with authors).  
30  Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Accelerator project, Ministry of Defence, UK, 
https://cispaces.org/ (on 28th January 2018). 
31 Karadžić Judgment (n 1), para. 5810. 
32 Ibid., para. 5811. 
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point prior to his conversation with Deronjić’ on the evening of 13 July.33 Despite 
this finding, the Chamber only felt able to make a positive determination that the 
accused agreed to the expansion of the common plan to include the killing of the 
men and boys of Srebrenica ‘as of the moment of the conversation with 
Deronjić.’34  
 
19. The conversation between the Accused and Deronjić took place at approximately 
8.10 pm on 13 July.35 During that conversation, Deronjić was asked ‘how many 
thousands’, to which he replied ‘about two… bur there’ll be more during the 
night.’36 The intermediary informed Deronjić that the Accused said ‘All the goods 
must be placed inside the warehouses before twelve tomorrow… not in the 
warehouses over there, but somewhere else.’37 The Chamber understood the 
references to ‘goods’ in this conversation to refer to the detainees who were at that 
time held on buses and in detention facilities in Bratunac. 38  The Chamber 
determined that the reference to ‘not in the warehouses over there, but somewhere 
else’ was the Accused’s instruction to Deronjić to have the detainees transferred to 
Zvornik, where they were killed between 14 and 16 July.39 
 
20. The Chamber held that the Accused’s ‘shared intent [with the principal 
perpetrators]’ was ‘reaffirmed by the fact that, from the moment he directed 
Deronjić to move the detainees to Zvornik the Accused became, and subsequently 
continued to be, actively involved in overseeing the implementation of the plan to 
eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by killing the men and boys.’40  
 
21. The Chamber’s conclusions that the Accused was ‘actively involved’ in the 
oversight of the killing of the men and boys after the 13 July conversation, and 
that his shared intent can be inferred from his activities after that conversation, 
appear to be based on the following factual findings, charted in Figure 3 below: 																																																								
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
35 Ibid., para. 5772. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Ibid., para. 5710. 
39 Ibid., paras. 5714-5723.  
40 Ibid., para. 5811.  
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a. The Accused monitored international media coverage of the events in 
Srebrenica.41 The Accused received a copy of the statement issued to the 
media on 17 July 1995 at around 18.30 on the evening of its issue,42 and 
referred to it in an interview with David Frost.43 The statement summarized 
the agreement reached at the third Hotel Fontana meeting on 12 July 1995, 
and was signed by Deronjić, Mandžić (acting as representative of the 
Bosnian Muslim population) and Franken (acting as representative of 
UNPROFOR).44 In the same interview with Frost, when asked about the 
15,000 men from Srebrenica who were unaccounted for, the Accused stated 
that Bosnian Serb Forces had opened the lines and allowed the men to pass 
through to Bosnian Muslim-held territory.45 
b. International organisations, namely the ICRC and the UN Centre for 
Human Rights, were not granted access to Srebrenica and other areas under 
the control of Bosnian Serb Forces.46 The ICRC was granted access to 
Batković camp in late July, where they were able to locate 164 detainees 
from Srebrenica.47 
c. In late July and early August 1995, the Accused promoted and praised some 
of the military personnel who played key roles in the takeover of 
Srebrenica, including Mladić, Živanović, and Krstić.48 
d. In August 1995, referring to ‘Muslim soldiers’, the Accused stated that 
‘several thousand fighters did manage to get through’ and that ‘we were not 
able to encircle the enemy and destroy them’.49 The Chamber interpreted 
this statement as expressing regret that the corridor had been opened on 16 
July.50  
																																																								
41 Ibid., para. 5785. On 17 July 1995, a statement created by Bosnian Serb representatives summarizing 
the outcomes of the third Hotel Fontana meeting was released to the media; this was received by the 
accused at 6.30 pm on 17 July (Ibid., paras. 5128-5129). 
42 Ibid., para. 5129. 
43 Ibid., para. 5786. 
44 Ibid., para. 5128. 
45 Ibid., para. 5786. 
46 Ibid., paras. 5787-5788. 
47 Ibid., para. 5788. 
48 Ibid., para. 5789. 
49 Ibid., para. 5791. 
50 Ibid., paras. 5471-5473.  
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e. On 22 March 1996, the Accused told Mladić of plans to investigate the 
killings in Srebrenica.51 Initial steps were taken, but no investigations were 
ever carried out.52 	
22. The Trial Chamber also made findings on the Accused’s conduct in the time 
before it held that he agreed to the expansion of the plan to include the killing of 
the men and boys. These included findings on orders issued53 and the role of the 
Accused in operational matters.54 It will be recalled that the Chamber held that the 
Accused knew of and participated in the plan to forcibly remove the women, 
children, and elderly men from Srebrenica ‘as of the evening of 11 July’,55 and 
that he agreed to the expansion of that plan to encompass the killing of the able-
bodied men and boys on the evening of 13 July,56 ‘as of the moment of the 
conversation with Deronjić’.57 In light of the Chamber’s clear statement that 
genocidal intent could only be inferred from the time of the evening of 13 July,58 
no inference can be drawn from these earlier contextual findings on the role and 
conduct of the Accused. As such, these elements have not been charted in Figure 3 
below.  
 
23. In addition to the phone call with Deronjić, the Chamber’s finding that the 
Accused knew of the expansion of the common plan to include killing appears to 
be based on the following findings, which we have charted in Figure 4 below: 
a. The Accused met with Kovač on 13 July59 and 14 July.60 Kovač had earlier 
been present in the Zvornik, Bratunac, and Srebrenica areas, and had met 
with and/or received communications from Vašić, Mladić, and 
																																																								
51 Ibid., para. 5793. 
52 Ibid., paras. 5794-5796. 
53 E.g. Directive 7, issued 8 March 1995, discussed ibid., para. 5756, and the Accused’s 11 July order 
appointing Deronjić as civilian commissioner for Srebrenica, discussed ibid., para. 5693. 
54 E.g. in approving the passage of humanitarian aid convoys (ibid., paras. 5757-5758) and in assigning 
combat roles and dealing with requests for MUP troops (ibid., para. 5759). 
55 Ibid., para. 5814. 
56 Id.  
57 Ibid., para. 5811. 
58 Ibid., para. 5829. 
59 Ibid., para. 5781. 
60 Ibid., para. 5780. 
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Borovčanin. 61  The Chamber held that Kovač would have shared this 
knowledge with the Accused.62 
b. The Accused met with Deronjić on 14 July.63 While there was no direct 
evidence of the content of their conversation, the Chamber had ‘no doubt’ 
that the Accused and Deronjić discussed the killings at the Kravica 
Warehouse on 13 July 1995, and the implementation of the Accused’s 
instructions to Deronjić given in their phone conversation in the evening of 
13 July.64  
c. The Accused met with Bajagić on 15 July 1995. Bajagić had witnessed the 
detention of Bosnian Muslim men at the Nova Kasaba football field and 
heard about the Kravica warehouse killings.65  
d. The Accused received a phone call on 13 July telling him that Srebrenica 
‘was done’.66 The Chamber found that this phone call was received from 
Mladić.67 
 
IV. CHARTING THE TRIAL CHAMBER’S FINDINGS ON KARADŽIĆ’S DOLUS 
SPECIALIS IN RELATION TO THE GENOCIDE IN SREBRENICA 
 
24. In the charts that follow, we used the principles of logic set out at section II above 
to illustrate the apparent evidentiary and inferential bases for the Chamber’s 
findings.  
 
25. The following chart—Figure 3—depicts our understanding of the Chamber’s line 
of reasoning in concluding that the Accused was actively involved in the oversight 
of the killing of the men and boys after the 13 July conversation. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
61 Ibid., para. 5781. 
62 Ibid., para. 5804. 
63 Ibid., para. 5807. 
64 Ibid., para. 5808. 
65 Ibid., para. 5783. 
66 Ibid., para. 5768. 
67 Ibid., para. 5769.  
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Figure 3 Our understanding of Chamber's reasoning line to conclude that the Accused was actively 
involved in the oversight of the killing of the men and boys after the 13 July conversation 
 
26. Appendix B lists the complete definitions of the argumentation schemes used in 
the analysis. Squared solid lined boxes represent information gathered from the 
Trial Chamber’s judgment, unless explicitly marked with Unstated. In this case, 
we intend to highlight how a particular factual finding seems missing but 
necessary to expose the entire line of reasoning. Since this is based on our own 
understanding, we did not include an analysis of critical questions for the 
inferences based on such unstated pieces of information, although we would 
strongly advocate such an exercise, should the Appeals Chamber agree that such 
unstated inferences did appear to play a role in the Trial Chamber’s conclusions.  
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27. Circled boxes in Figure 3 represent inferences, thus adding semantics on the links 
between pieces of information.68 Dotted areas identify inferences for which there 
are critical questions69 that were not explicitly addressed in the Trial Chamber’s 
judgment, marked with Inference followed by a number and a letter. The 
inferences in Figure 3 give rise to the following critical questions: 
 
• Inference 3.a 
1. Was there any other reasonable explanation for the statements that 
‘several thousand fighters did manage to get through’ and ‘we were 
not able to encircle the enemy and destroy them’, other than that 
they were an illustration of regret that the corridor had been opened 
on 16 July? 
 
• Inference 3.b 
1. Was it established as true that the Accused received the request for 
access from international organisations? 
2. Was there any other reasonable explanation for why international 
organisations were not granted access to Srebrenica, other than this 
being true because the Accused was actively involved in the 
oversight of the killings after the 13 July conversation? 
 
• Inference 3.c 
1. Was there any other reasonable explanation for why, in late July 
and early August 1995, the Accused promoted and praised Mladić, 
Živanović, and Krstić, other than it being true because the Accused 
was actively involved in the oversight of the killings after the 13 
July conversation? 
 
• Inference 3.d 
																																																								
68 To simplify the presentation of the graphs, differently from the examples presented in Section II we 
omitted elements of argumentation schemes—e.g. major premises of arguments from evidence to 
hypothesis—when they are clearly inferred from the context. 
69 Outlined further in Appendix B below. 
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1. Was there any other reasonable explanation for why no 
investigations were ever carried out, other than it being true 
because the Accused was actively involved in the oversight of the 
killings after the 13 July conversation? 
 
28. The following chart—Figure 4—depicts our understanding of the Chamber’s line 
of reasoning that led it to conclude that the Accused was knowledgeable of the 
intent to kill Bosnian Muslims. Figure 4 follows the same conventions used for 
Figure 370 with the exception that Inference 4.cX groups together some of the 
inferences leading to the conclusion that the Accused conveyed to Deronjić the 
direction that the detainees should be transferred to Zvornik.71  
 
29. It is worth highlighting that, unlike Figure 3, Figure 4 includes encircled boxes 
representing conflicts between pieces of information, identified with colored boxes 
and the label CON.72 Also unlike Figure 3, Figure 4 depicts two arguments from 
Witness Testimony; for those arguments, we did not analyse critical questions, as 
the assessment of witness credibility and reliability is one for the Trial Chamber 
alone to make.73  
 
 
																																																								
70 See above, para. 27.  
71 This is just to increase the readability of the rather dense graph: it does not modify the pragmatics of 
the analysis. 
72 See above, para. 15, for further explanation.  
73 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-95-16-A, 23 October 2001, para. 30. See 
further above, para. 4.  
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Figure 4 Our understanding of the Trial Chamber’s line of reasoning in concluding that the Accused was 
knowledgeable of the intent to kill Bosnian Muslims 
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30. The inferences in this Figure 4, and their related critical questions, are as follows:  
 
• Inference 4.a 
1. What evidence supported the finding that Kovač relayed back 
additional important information to the Accused when he returned to 
Pale on 14 July? 
 
• Inference 4.b 
1. What evidence supported the finding that Kovač discussed these 
matters with the Accused? 
 
• Inference 4.cX 
1. Is there any other reasonable explanation for why Davidović had 
urged Deronjić to ‘use [his] connections’ with the Accused in order 
to have the buses moved, other than it being true because the 
Accused conveyed to Deronjić the direction that the detainees should 
be transferred to Zvornik? 
2. Is there any other reasonable explanation for why, before speaking to 
the Accused, Deronjić had previously complained to Beara about the 
detainees’ presence in Bratunac, other than it being true because the 
Accused conveyed to Deronjić the direction that the detainees should 
be transferred to Zvornik? 
3. Is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the intercepted 
phone conversation that the Accused instructed Deronjić that all 
detainees should be transferred to Zvornik? 
 
• Inference 4.d 
1. Is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from Deronjić’s 
participation in the efforts to bury the bodies of those killed at the 
Kravica Warehouse, and the fact that he met with the Accused 
shortly afterwards, that he would have discussed the killings with the 
Accused?  
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• Inference 4.e 
1. What evidence supports the claim that Kovač discussed the   
developments on the ground in Srebrenica on 13 July? 
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
31. In the charts above, we have attempted to identify the precise factual and 
inferential bases for the Trial Chamber’s findings that the Accused’s genocidal 
intent in the Trial Chamber judgment, and to elucidate the forms of reasoning that 
led to these conclusions. We have highlighted conclusions that appear to be 
implicit in the Trial Chamber’s factual findings but not expressly stated. In 
addition, each of the inferences identified above gives rise to a number of ‘Critical 
Questions’, which the Appeals Chamber may wish to consider in its determination 
of the issue. 
 
32. It is important to recall that the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt does 
not apply to each individual fact, nor is it solely limited to the question of the 
culpability or otherwise of the accused. The standard of proof applies to	‘each and 
every element of the offences charged’.74 In the present case, the accused’s mens 
rea is clearly an element of the offence of genocide in Srebrenica. The Trial 
Chamber judgment’s findings on the Accused’s knowledge of the expansion of the 
plan (Figure 4) and his active involvement in the killings (Figure 3) were clearly 
‘material facts’ upon which proof of mens rea hinged.75 
 
33. The set of arguments depicted in Figure 3 justifies the claim that the Accused was 
actively involved in the oversight of the killing of the men and boys after the 13 
July conversation. However, for each inference line supporting this conclusion, 
either necessary premises are unstated (hence left to the reader to assume), or at 
least one relevant critical question is not explicitly answered.  
 																																																								
74 Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Judgment, Case No. IT-06-90-T, 15 April 2011, para. 14.  
75 Prosecutor v. Halilović, Judgment, Case No. IT-01-48-A, 16 October 2007, para. 109; Prosecutor v. 
Martić, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-11-A, 8 October 2008, para. 55; Prosecutor v. Miloševič (Dragomir), 
Judgment, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, 12 November 2009, para. 20; Prosecutor v. Mladić, Judgment, Case 
No. IT-09-92-T, 22 November 2017, para. 5250. 
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34. The set of arguments depicted in Figure 4 justifies the conclusion that the Accused 
was knowledgeable of the intent to kill Bosnian Muslims. As depicted above, the 
only line of reasoning supporting this conclusion that relies solely upon witness 
testimony (and not unstated findings or pieces of information for which critical 
questions have not explicitly been answered) is that based upon Nikolić’s 
testimony that he overheard Deronjić say that the Accused had instructed Deronjić 
that all detainees should be transferred to Zvornik.76 
 
35. Another line of reasoning justifying the conclusion in Figure 4 is based on Simić’s 
testimony that Deronjić told him that he had informed the Accused about the 
events at the Kravica Warehouse the day after the incident,77 in conjunction with 
the unstated assumption that if the Accused knew that Bosnian Muslims had been 
recently killed by Bosnian Serb forces [in Kravica Warehouse], then he might 
have known that it may occur that Bosnian Serb forces would kill other Bosnian 
Muslims in the future. 
 
36. A third line of reasoning is based on an abductive inference with the unstated 
premise that Mladić78 informed Karadžić, on 13 July, that Srebrenica ‘[wa]s done’. 
The Trial Chamber appears to have concluded that, given that Srebrenica had 
fallen on 11 July, Karadžić would have known this by 13 July. From that unstated 
inference, it drew a further inference that the conversation implied that Karadžić 
knew of the intent to kill the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
37. Depending on its answers to the above critical questions, the Appeals Chamber 
may conclude that the Trial Chamber’s conclusions from the above evidence and 
inferences that the accused that the Accused knew of the intent of the perpetrators 
to destroy the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, and was actively involved in 
overseeing the implementation of the plan to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in 
Srebrenica by killing the men and boys, were conclusions that a reasonable 																																																								
76 Karadžić Judgment (n 1), para. 5312, n 18025, and para. 5773. 
77 Ibid., para. 5808. 
78 There was some debate about whether the phone conversation was with Mladić or another member of 
the VRS, and what was said: ibid., paras. 5768-5770. 
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Tribunal of fact could have drawn. Alternatively, it may determine that these were 
conclusions that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached.79 
 
VII. RELIEF REQUESTED 
 
38. The Appeals Chamber is respectfully requested to take these submissions into 
consideration in rendering its judgment. 
 
Word count (including Appendices): 7747 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
_____________________________     _____________________________  
DR YVONNE MCDERMOTT REES  DR FEDERICO CERUTTI 
 
 
 
																																																								
79 Article 23(1)(b), MICT Statute (referring to ‘an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of 
justice’. The identical wording of Article 25(1)(b), ICTY Statute and Article 24(1)(b), ICTR Statute has 
been interpreted to require the Appeals Chamber to assess whether the conclusion is one that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have reached in, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, Case No. IT-
95-14-A, 29 July 2004, para. 16. In Kupreškić, the Appeals Chamber noted that this standard would be 
met and a conviction would be overturned where ‘the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Trial 
Chamber returned a conviction on the basis of evidence that could not have been accepted by any 
reasonable tribunal or where the evaluation of evidence was “wholly erroneous.”’: Kupreškić et al. 
Appeal Judgment (n 73), para. 41. 
6378MICT-13-55-A
	 21	
Appendix A: Trial Chamber’s findings: relevant timeline 
• 11 July 1995 
o During the night between 11 and 12 July 1995, the column of Bosnian 
Muslim men started moving in a northwesterly direction towards Tuzla, 
trying to cross the Bratunac–Konjević Polje Road1 
• 12 July 1995 
o 1000h 
Popović told Momir Nikolić that “all the balijas should be killed.” 
• 13 July 1995 
o Morning/Afternoon 
§ Bosnian Muslim men from the column who had either 
surrendered or been captured after emerging from the woods, 
were assembled near the Bratunac–Konjević Polje Road2 
§ Groups of detainees were put on buses or marched towards the 
Kravica Warehouse3 
o 1550h—1610h 
§ Between 3:50 and 4:10 p.m. on 13 July, the Accused met Kovač 
in Pale. Immediately thereafter, Kovač departed towards 
Vlasenica. The Chamber notes that Kovač testified that during 
this meeting, he and the Accused discussed the situation around 
Sarajevo, which Kovač claimed he had felt was of far greater 
concern at the time. However, having analysed the entirety of 
Kovač’s testimony in light of the totality of the evidence, the 
Chamber notes numerous internal inconsistencies within 
Kovač’s testimony, as well as inconsistencies with prior 
statements given under oath. In the Chamber’s view, these 
inconsistencies, as well the evasiveness and even intermittent 
combativeness displayed by Kovač throughout his testimony, 
arise from Kovač’s efforts to minimise his own involvement in 
the events in Srebrenica in July 1995. The Chamber has 
therefore approached his testimony with extreme caution and 
has only relied upon it where it is consistent with other 
evidence.4 
o 1630h—Night 
§ Some time after 4:30 p.m., one of the Bosnian Muslim detainees 
brought to the warehouse took away the rifle of Krsto 
Dragišević—a member of the 3rd kelani Platoon—and shot him 
dead. […]Members of the 3rd Skelani Platoon started shooting 
at the detainees in response to the killing of Dragišević.5 
																																																								
1 Karadžić Judgment (n 1), para. 5157. 
2 Ibid., para. 5174. 
3 Ibid., para. 5180. 
4 Ibid., para. 5766. 
5 Ibid., para. 5228. 
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§ According to KDZ063, some time after arriving at the Kravica 
Warehouse, the Bosnian Serb soldiers guarding the detainees 
became agitated and angry. Shortly after, intense shooting began 
outside the warehouse, lasting approximately half an hour. 
While the shooting was ongoing, the soldiers came in and out of 
the warehouse and seemed to be in a panic, yelling at the 
detainees that the Muslims were attacking the soldiers. The 
detainees panicked and became frightened as they did not know 
what was happening outside. After the first period of shooting 
ended, two uniformed men entered the East Room and started 
shooting at the detainees; five to ten soldiers followed and 
joined in.6 
§ As members of the Bosnian Serb Forces entered the warehouse 
and shot at the detainees with M-84 machine guns and automatic 
rifles, gunshots were also fired at the doors and windows from 
outside. In addition to the shooting, a number of hand-grenades 
were thrown in the warehouse through the windows.7 
§ The shooting quieted down as the night fell.8 
o 1700h—1840h 
§ A telephone connection was established and the Accused had an 
hour-long conversation, part of which occurred over the 
speakerphone. Ristić recalled that it had been very difficult to 
hear because the line kept going down. However, the end result 
of the conversation was that the participants in the meeting 
understood that Srebrenica “[wa]s done.”9 
Ristić testified that the Accused had addressed the person on the 
other end of the line as “General Mladić”. Premović also 
testified that the person who had called the Accused during their 
meeting was Mladić. The Chamber notes that Trifković insisted 
that the Accused did not speak with Mladić; however, the 
Chamber recalls its assessment of Trifković’s credibility 
outlined above. […] The Chamber is satisfied that, as testified 
by Ristić and Premović, the Accused indeed spoke to Mladić 
during their meeting on 13 July.10 
o 1900h 
§ Drago Nikolić called Dragan Obrenović at the Standard 
Barracks and told him that Popović had just telephoned to 
inform him that a large number of Bosnian Muslims who were 
being detained in Bratunac would be transferred to Zvornik to be 
shot. 18007 Drago Nikolić then reported that Popović had said 
																																																								
6 Ibid., para. 5230. 
7 Ibid., para. 5232. 
8 Ibid., para. 5234. 
9 Ibid., para. 5768. 
10 Ibid., para. 5769. 
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the order came from Mladić, and that “everyone, including 
Pandurević was aware of [it].”11 
o 2010h 
§ At approximately 8:10 p.m., the Accused was recorded in an 
intercepted conversation with Deronjić, which was conducted 
through an intermediary and unfolded as follows: 
 
: I’m waiting for a call to President Karadžić. Is 
he there? 
B: Yes. 
: Hello! Just a minute, the duty officer will 
answer now, Mr. President. 
B: Hello! I have Deronjić on line. 
: Deronjić speak up. 
D: Hello! Yes. I can hear you. 
: Deronjić, the President is asking how many 
thousands? 
D: About two for the time being. 
: Two, Mr. President. (heard in the background) 
D: But there’ll be more during the night. 
[…] 
D: Can you hear me, President? 
: The President can’t hear you, Deronjić, this is 
the intermediary. 
D: I have about two thousand here now by [...] 
: Deronjić, the President says: “All the goods 
must be placed inside the warehouses before 
twelve tomorrow.” 
D: Right. 
: Deronjić, not in the warehouses over there, but 
somewhere else. 
D: Understood. 
: Goodbye.12 
 
The Chamber finds that the discussion between the Accused and 
Deronjić pertained to the accommodation of the Bosnian 
Muslim men who were then being held on buses and in 
detention facilities in Bratunac.13 
§ Mladić’s order for the transfer of a large number of Bosnian 
Muslims who were being detained in Bratunac to Zvornik, 
where they were to be detained and, ultimately, shot, was 
conveyed down the chain of command by members of the VRS 
security organs. 14 
 
• 14 July 1995 																																																								
11 Ibid., para. 5309. 
12 Ibid., para. 5772. 
13 Ibid., para. 5710. 
14 Ibid., para. 5711. 
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o Just after midnight 
§ Beara and Deronjić argued about where the Bosnian Muslim 
men were to be executed, as Beara insisted that he had 
instructions from his “boss” that the detainees were to remain in 
Bratunac, and Deronjić countered that the Accused had 
instructed him that all detainees in Bratunac should be 
transferred to Zvornik. Eventually, Beara and Deronjić agreed 
that the detainees would indeed be transferred to Zvornik.15  
§ Some of the detainees being held in Bratunac town began to be 
transferred to the first of four detention sites in Zvornik, where 
members of the Zvornik Brigade MP were awaiting their 
arrival.16 
o Morning 
§ Popović, Beara, and Drago Nikolić met at the Standard Barracks 
in Zvornik.17 
§ Pursuant to an order from Beara, Popović—with the assistance 
of Momir Nikolić—organised a convoy to transport the 
remaining Bosnian Muslim males in Bratunac to the buildings in 
Zvornik which had been designated for their detention.18 
§ Beara, Popović, and Drago Nikolić supervised the ongoing 
operation at multiple detention and killing sites in the Zvornik 
area between 14 and 16 July.19 
  
																																																								
15 Ibid., para. 5712. 
16 Ibid., para. 5712. 
17 Ibid., para. 5713. 
18 Ibid., para. 5713. 
19 Ibid., para. 5714. 
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Appendix B: Argumentation Schemes used in the Analysis 
 
The following Argumentation Schemes have been used in this analysis: 
 
1. Abductive Inference (Adapted from the “Abductive Argumentation Scheme”20) 
 
Premise I: F is a finding or given set of facts. 
Premise II: E is a satisfactory explanation of F. 
Premise III: No alternative explanation E’ given so far is as satisfactory as E. 
Conclusion: Therefore, E is plausible, as a hypothesis. 
 
CQ1: How satisfactory is E as an explanation of F, apart from the alternative 
explanations available so far? 
CQ2: How much better an explanation is E than the alternative explanations available 
so far? 
CQ3: How thorough has the investigation of the case been? 
CQ4: Would it better to continue the investigation instead of drawing a conclusion at 
this point? 
  
2. Cause to Effect21 
 
Major Premise: Generally, if A occurs, then B might occur. 
Minor Premise: In this case A might occur. 
Conclusion: Therefore, in this case B might occur. 
 
CQ1: How strong is the causal generalisation? 
CQ2: Is the evidence cited (if there is any) strong enough to warrant the causal 
generalisation? 
CQ3: Are there other causal factors that could interfere with the production of the 
effect in the given case? 
 
3. Evidence to Hypothesis22 																																																								
20 Walton, Reed, and Macagno, Argumentation Schemes (n 16), 171. 
21 Ibid., 328. 
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Major Premise: If A (a hypothesis) is true, then B (a proposition reporting an event) 
will be observed to be true. 
Minor Premise: B has been observed to be true, in a given instance. 
Conclusion: Therefore, A is true. 
 
CQ1: Is it the case that if A is true, then B is true? 
CQ2: Has B been observed to be true? 
CQ3: Could there be some reason why B is true, other than its being true because of A 
being true? 
 
4. Opinion (Elaborated from the “Argument from Popular Opinion”23) 
 
Acceptance: A is accepted as true. 
Presumption Premise: If A is generally accepted as true, that gives a reason in favor of 
A. 
Conclusion: Therefore, there is a reason in favor of A. 
 
CQ1: What evidence supports the claim that A is accepted as true? 
CQ2: Even if A is accepted as true, are there any good reasons for doubting that it is 
true? 
 
5. Witness Testimony24 
 
Position to Known Premise: Witness W is in a position to know whether A is true or 
not 
Truth Telling Premise: Witness W is telling the truth (as W knows it). 
Statement Premise: Witness W states that A is true (false). 
Conclusion: Therefore, A may be plausibly taken to be true (false). 
 
CQ1: Is what the witness said internally consistent? 
																																																																																																																																																																
22 Ibid., 331. 
23 Ibid., 311. 
24 Ibid., 310. 
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CQ2: Is what the witness said consistent with the known facts of the case (based on 
evidence apart from what the witness testified to)? 
CQ3: Is what the witness said consistent with what other witnesses have 
(independently) testified to? 
CQ4: Is there some kind of bias that can be attributed to the account given by the 
witness? 
CQ5: How plausible is the statement A asserted by the witness? 
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